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Summary  findings
The Costa Rican Social Insurance Fund - the country's  *  Although there is no explicit early retirement
main social security institution - was established in  system, individuals have found a substitute for early
1941 to provide compulsory social insurance coverage  retirement in disability pensions.
for employees, through old-age, disability, and survivor  *  Health benefits to pensioners are paid out of
pensions, as well as sickness and maternity benefits.  pension contributions.
The current status of the pension system is alarming,  *  The system's reserves have not been well invested.
and reform is urgently needed. Among other things:  Reform of the system should be immediate. At a
* The system is costly to the government.  minimum, reform should include:
*  It promises generous benefits that are difficult to  *  Reduced benefits.
sustain.  - Higher contribution  rates.
* Contribution  rates are low.  *  A higher retirement age.
* The link between contributions and benefits is weak.  *  A stronger link between contributions and benefits.
*  Inflation indexing is inadequate and ad hoc.  *  The unbundling of health and pensionl accounts.
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comments.I.  Introduction
The Costa Rican Social Insurance Fund (CCSS), which is the main social security institution, was
established in 1941 to provide compulsory social insurance coverage for employees on old-age, disability
and survivor pensions as well as sickness-maternity benefits.
The pension system is fragmented, with 21 different schemes that have different rules and
regulations, covering approximately 50 percent of the working population.  CCSS covers 45 percent of the
working population, insuring both public and private workers.  Public workers that are not covered by
CCSS, which amount to 5 percent of the working population, are covered by 19 special schemes which are
independent from CCSS.  The government's recent reforms aimed at combining the 17 special schemes
(except the ones for teachers and judicial system) under a unified system.
The CCSS system is a partially funded defined benefit system based on scaled premiums.  In these
systems the contribution rate is set at a high enough level to create a reserve such that inflows of
contributions and investment income from the reserve cover the pension expenditures and administrative
costs during a given period.  When the reserve income and contributions are no longer sufficent to cover
the expenses, the contribution rate is raised to a higher level to ensure another period of equilibrium.'
These periods should be sufficiently long to ensure stability of contribution rates.
Scaled premium systems require periodic actuarial reviews to adjust the contribution rates to changes
in the demographic structure, investment income of the fund, benefit levels, and growing maturity of the
system.  Many countries with scaled premium systems encounter problems, because actuarial reviews are
delayed, overly generous benefits are promised, contribution rates remain low as the system matures, and
reserves are not well invested.  This is also the case in Costa Rica where actuarial reviews have only been
required since 1990.
The following features of the Costa Rican pension system highlight the alarming situation and the
need for urgent reform:
*  It is very costly for the govcrnment.  In 1994, over 12 percent of the budget will be spent on special
schemes.  An additional 3 percent is allocated to CCSS to partially cover the government's contribution.
The government already owes 16,100 million colones of unpaid contributions to CCSS from previous years.
In Costa Rica, the changes are made on the retirement age rather than the contribution  rate.  The retirement age was originally
set at 65 for both sexes to accumulate  reserves.  In 1980, it was lowered to 57.  In 1982 it was lowered to 55, only for women.  In
1991, with increasing  financial pressures, the retirement  age increased to 61 and 1 month for men and 59 and I month for womern.
Recently there  was another iicrease of 10 months for both sexes.*  It promises generous benefits with high targeted replacement rates which are very difficult to sustain
in the long run.  This is true for all schemes, and especially for special schemes since their benefits tend to
be even more generous.
*  Despite the generous benefits promised, it operates with low contribution rates which are again not
sustainable in the long run.  Low contribution rates from employees and employers coupled with high
replacement rates require the government to make large contributions (especially in the case of the special
schemes) which have become more and more difficult to fulfill.
*  The system has a weak link between contributions and benefits.  The minimum and maximum
limits on pensions, basing the pensionable salary on the last five years,  and other features make the pension
system highly redistributive.  The weak link between benefits and contributions leads to wide-spread
evasion and under-reporting of salaries to avoid the pension contributions which are perceived as taxes on
labor.
*  Inflation indexation is inadequate and ad hoc.  There is no adjustment for inflation in the calculation
of the pensionable salary.  Even after retirement the inflation adjustments of pensions and the minimum
pension are not made regularly and only if there are available funds. This is how the system lowers the
high promised replacement rates.  However, this leads to perverse redistributions.
*  XAlthough  there is no explicit early retirement system, individuals have found means to substitute
disability pensions for an early retirement system.  Due to generous benefits and lax regulations 30 percent
of the pension expenditures go to disability pensions.  Indeed, until 1992 there were more people getting
disability pensions than there were old age pensioners.
*@  Health benefits to pensioners of CCSS are paid out of pension contributions.  Approximately 10
percent of the expenses go to medical care.  This further weakens the link between contributions and
benefits.  Keeping health and pension benefits together also exacerbates financial problems since as
populations age health costs tend to increase at much higher rates than pension expenditures.
*  The system's reserves have not been well invested.  The investment in state bonds brought low
returns.  Until 1986 internal loans to sickness -maternity program were not good investments.  More
recently, CCSS and the Ministry of Finance have initiated plans to improve the investment performance of
the pension system.
Since the demographic structure is becoming more unfavorable and the system is maturing, reforms
of the social security system should be implemented without delay.  A reform of the existing system should
include a combination of measures such as reduction in benefits, increase in contribution rates, better
inflation indexation of the benefits, increasing the retirement age, creating a stronger link between benefits
and contributions, and unbundling health and pension accounts.  A more comprehensive reform option is to
move towards a multi-pillar system, with a basic pay-as-you-go redistributive public pillar complemented
by a defined contribution savings pillar and additional voluntary savings schemes.  (See Box 1 for a
discussion of a multi-pillar pension system.)
2The paper is organized as follows.  Section II describes the present system and highlights its
problems.  Section III illustrates the fiscal cost of the present system within the framework of a simulation
model.  Section IV describes and evaluates different reform options and concludes with recommendations
for reform.
Box 1:  A Multi-pillar  Pension System'
Ideally, old age security policies should:
*  Facilitate people's efforts to save for their old age;
*  Redistribute  additional income to the old who are lifetime  poor;
*  Minimize costs that impede growth, such as reduced labor employment,  reduced saving, excessive fiscal burdens, and
misallocated  public resources;
*  Be sustainable and adaptable  based on long term planning;
*  Be simple, transparent, and provide a strong link between contributions  and benefits.
One of the prime policy issues to be resolved in the design of old age security programs is the relative importance  of the
redistribution, saving and insurance functions and the role of government  in each.  One way of achieving  multiple objectives at
least cost to society is through a multi-pillar  approach:
1. Public pillar:  The essence  of this pillar is that it fulfills the objective  of redistributing  to the old who are lifetime poor.  It is
managed by government, offers defined benefits  that are not actuarially tied to contributions, financed out of (mostly) general tax
revenue on a pay-as-you-go  basis.
2. Mandatory savings pillar:  The objective  of this pillar is to facilitate  individuals' efforts to save for their old age.  It is a
compulsory, preferably privately-managed,  fully-funded  defined-contribution  program based on individual  capitalization accounts.
This pillar is not redistributive and thus minimizes  labor market distortions and incentives to evade.  It is likely to increase long-
term savings more than the public pay-as-you-go  pillar.
3. Occupational and Voluntary Pillars:  The occupational  pillar consists  of privately managed  pensions offered by employers as an
incentive  to attact and retain workers. The voluntary pillar includes other privately managed  saving and insurance schemes that
are often encouraged  by tax incentives  and are not redistributive.
To some extent these pillars are substitutes  for each other, but they are not perfect substitutes  because they have different goals
and satisfy the needs of different groups.  Sharing responsibility  for old age security between two or more pillars achieves the
multiple objectives  of redistribution, saving and insurance  at least cost, including  evasionary and distortionary costs.
This box draws on The Old Age Security Report, 1994.
3II.  The Present  System and  its Problems
A. Structure
The Costa Rican pension system is very fragmented.  There are 21 different schemes (regimes) with
their own rules and conditions, covering approximately half of the working population. The main social
security institution is the Caja Costarricense del Seguro Social - CCSS - that insures all covered private
employees and about 60 percent of the public sector employees, which adds up to 45 percent of the
working population (see Table 1). In addition, the CCSS administers a non-contributory welfare program
for the government.  The remaining 5 percent of the working population are covered by 19 special schemes
which cover the rest (40 percent) of the public sector employees and are independent from the CCSS.
Some of these, especially those for teachers, judicial, and financial employees, have traditionally been very
generous.  Special schemes are financed largely by the budget with public sector employees contributing
only 10 percent of pension costs.
Table 1.  Costa Rica: Coverage  of CCSS, 1988-1992
Contributors  Beneficiaries  Dependency rate
1992  544,649  74,456  13.7
1991  511,874  67,185  13.1
1990  499,890  62,601  12.5
1989  484,175  57,690  11.9
1988  459,490  52,578  11.4
Source:  Anuario Estadistico,  1992, CCSS.
The fragmentation of the system and the differences in benefits and contributions impede labor
mobility and cause inequalities among different groups.  The government is in the process of unifying the
special schemes.  On June 15, 1992 a new General Framework Pension Regime Law was approved by the
Legislative Assembly to bring the 17 special programs, except those for teachers and judicial employees,
under common rules. 2 The government also reformed the pension program for teachers, one of the most
generous special programs, by capping the maximum contribution, tightening the eligibility criteria,  and
modifying the benefit formula.  New employees started accumulating a capitalization fund.  However
changes in the retirement age and benefits were contested and the case is still at the constitutional court.
Furthermore, the unification is not valid for existing pensioners and contributors, and therefore the
transition from the fragmented system to a uniform one will take a long time. 3
2  Originally the new law intended  to bring all 19 regimes under one unified scheme  but strong political opposition led to
exclusion of the schemes for teachers and the judicial system.
3  Originally the Law intended to move everyone  currently in the special regimes into the unified scheme but the Constitutional
Body ruled that the move for the existing  pensioners  and contributors  could only be voluntary. Given that the special regimes are
much more generous than the unified scheme, the existing  pensioners  have no incentive to move to the new scheme.
4Table 2 provides  a breakdown  of CCSS  revenue  and expenditures. In 1994, the government  plans
to spend 32.5 billion colones  on pensions  (26 billion  on special regimes,  6.5 to partially  cover the
contribution  to CCSS)  out of a 213 billion colones  budget. The government  has not been fully paying its
contributions  to CCSS. After the 1993 payment  of 9 billion colones, the government  still owes CCSS 13.8
billion  colones in principal and 3.3 billion  colones  in interest.
Table  2
Costa  Rica:  Distribution  of CCSS Revenue  and Expenditures
1988  1989  1990  1991  1992
Revenues  (in %)
workers  22.45  22.94  22.79  21.56  22.68
employer  41.49  42.48  40.83  37.57  42.73
state  2.24  2.30  2.36  2.15  2.30
investment  32.93  31.52  33.12  35.89  31.78
other  0.90  0.77  0.90  0.70  0.52
Expenses  (in %)
health  9.65  9.54  9.63  9.59  9.63
pensions  84.55  83.96  84.69  84.50  84.65
administrative  4.61  5.08  4.19  4.77  4.84
other  1.20  1.42  1.49  1.15  0.87
total/gdp  1.73  1.81  1.93  1.93
Source:  Costa  Rica  Indicadores  de Seguridad  Social  1988-1992.
Table 3 shows government's spending on special pension programs.  Although special programs
cover only 5 percent of the working  population,  they absorb  80 percent of government  spending  on
pensions. As a percent of GDP, government's  spending  on special  regimes has also been increasing,
reaching  approximately  2 percent in 1992.
Total pension  expenditures  have been approximately  4 percent of GDP.  Half of this amount is due
to CCSS's expenditures  and the rest is government  spending  on special  programs. Approximately  10
percent of CCSS's expenditures  go to health benefits  provided  to beneficiaries  of the program.
International  experience  shows that as populations  age, health  expenditures  increase  at a much higher rate,
contributing  to the financial  problems  of the pension  systems. Health and pension  programs should  be
separated  to avoid this problem and to ensure a close link between  contributions  and benefits.
5Table 3
Costa  Rica: Government  Expenditure  on Special  Pension Programs
(in million  colones)
1990  1991  1992  1993*
Teachers  6,023.5  8,008.3  11,849.6  9,051.7
Finance  1,973.9  2,524.0  3,123.1  2,646.8
Communications  70.7  76.6  620.1  528.1
Others  2,056.8  2,431.2  1,730.1  1,486.7
Total  10,124.9  13,040.1  17,322.9  13,713.3
% of gdp  1.94  1.89  1.97
* as of September 1993.
Source: Costa Rica Ministry  of Finance.
B. The Level of Benefits
Benefits  vary considerably  across  individual  schemes  depending  on the definition  of pensionable
salary, required length  of service, replacement  rates, and retirement  age.  Special  schemes  tend to have
more generous benefits  and lower  retirement  ages than the CCSS scheme. In general, the level of benefits
is very high and difficult  to sustain in the long run.  The following  features  of the CCSS scheme highlight
the reasons for the high cost of the system.
(i) Retirement  Age: The normal  retirement  age was recently  increased  to 59 years 11 months for
women,  and 61 years 11 months for men. Retirement  from covered employment  is not necessary  to receive
a pension. Many developing  countries  have low retirement  ages due to the shorter life expectancy  and
poorer health of old people. In developed  countries,  however, where life expectancy  is higher, retirement
age is usually 65 or older.  Given  that Costa  Rica has a life expectancy  of 76 years there is still room to
increase  the retirement  age. In principle  normal  retirement  age should  be extended  in line with
improvements  in life expectancy  and productive  ability of older people, since low retirement  ages with high
life expectancy  add considerably  to the financial  burden of pension  systems.
(ii) Replacement  Rate:  The replacement  rate has recently  decreased  to 60 percent of pensionable
salary, plus .0835 percent for each month worked  over 20 years.  Thus, a worker with 40 years of service
can expect a replacement  rate of over 80 percent. Although  still very high, this represents  an improvement
over the replacement  rates of 80-100  percent before the 1993  reform.  In special  schemes the replacement
6rate is generally 100 percent.  These replacement rates are extremely high and unsustainable in the long run
and should be lowered considerably.  In addition, to start with such a high base pension favors workers
with short length of service. Instead of a high base pension, having a constant accrual rate for each year or
making the pension proportional to actualized average lifetime earnings would avoid this distortion.
(iii) Vesting Requirements:  For public and private employees, the required length of service for a
normal pension is 20 years.  Until recent changes took place, however, private sector employees could
receive a minimum pension by just working 5 years.  This led to distortions and adverse distributions in the
system.  It is also easier for the private sector workers to evade the system by either not contributing or
under-reporting their income.  In this way, the system redistributes from public to private sector
employees.  On the other hand, public sector workers who just miss the required minimum (by working
only 19 years) do not qualify for any pension unless they continue to contribute.  To avoid such injustices,
public and private sector employees should be treated equally and proportional pensions should be paid
instead of using minimum vesting requirements.
(iv) Minimum and Maximum pension:  Minimum and maximum pensions are commonly used as
redistributive devices.  CCSS has both a minimum and a maximum pension.  Minimum pensions are
common not only for redistributive purposes but also as means of protecting pensioners against inflation.
They are generally set as a percentage of minimum wage.  Costa Rica's is 80 percent of the minimum
wage, which is 17,600 colones.  The maximum pension is used to prevent high replacement rates for
individuals with high earnings and is another way of de-linking the contributions and benefits. For Costa
Rica it is 120,000 colones at the normal retirement age, and 175,000 colones if retirement is postponed.
However, when the maximum pension is specified as a level it causes evasion since workers try to under-
report their incomes and contribute less, to just qualify for the maximum pension.  This is especially true
since there is no ceiling on taxable wages.  Setting the benefit ceiling as a percentage of a person's
pensionable salary but decreasing replacement rates with salary would be a better way of capping the
pensions, but retaining a link between the earnings and pension benefits.
(v) Pensionable Salary:  Pensionable salary is based on the highest 48 monthly wage or salary
payments during the last 5 years of coverage. In the private sector, this system encourages under-reporting
of salaries during most of a person's career.  In the final years, salaries are reported high enough to qualify
for the maximum pension.  Use of a longer term or even average lifetime actualized earnings would avoid
these distortions.  Use of actualized lifetime earnings would also make accrual rates unnecessary.
(vi) Inflation Indexation:  Inflation indexation is very inadequate and ad hoc, and causes capricious
redistributions.  It is common practice among developing countries to promise high replacement rates, and
to ease the resulting financial burden by not adequately indexing benefits to inflation.  Costa Rica is not an
exception.  First, calculation of the pensionable salary on which the initial pension is based ignores inflation
completely. Since the pensionable salary can cover a five year time period, this can mean considerable
inflation (annual inflation has been approximately 15 percent over the last years).  Pensioners of special
schemes avoid this erosion of the pensionable salary to a large extent, since their pensions are based on the
last year's salary.  Second, after retirement, pensions are adjusted at irregular intervals, based on
"availability of financing." This leads to a significant erosion in the standard of living of retirees as they
age, until they reach the minimum pension.
7In principle, the adjustments are based on prices or wages, whichever is lower.  If adjustments were
made regularly, this practice would minimize the burden on the fund, and is advisable.  Although price
indexation protects the standard of living of pensioners, it may cause a big financial burden on the system if
the real wages are falling.  Wage indexation would avoid this problem, but would require higher
contribution rates than price indexation if real wages are rising.  Using price or wage indexation, whichever
is lower, avoids these problems.  However, whatever the method of indexation, inflation should be taken
into account regularly in calculating the pensionable salary and in adjusting the pensions.
(vii)  Survivor and Disability Pensions:  Survivor pensions vary from 40 to 70 percent of the
pension benefits depending on the age of the survivor, and whether he/she is the spouse or child. They
require 2 years of contributions by the insured.  Disability pensions are equal to old age pension (which is
60 percent of the pensionable salary unless the person has worked over 20 years) and require only 3 years
of service.  Before the 1993 reforms, disability pension could be over 80 percent of the pensionable salary
with just  3 years of service.  Due to the generous terms of the disability pension, individuals substituted it
for early retirement, which does not exist in Costa Rica.  As a result, 30 percent of the expenditures of the
pension system goes to disability payments.  To prevent abuse of the system, the disability rate should be
further lowered and its eligibility requirements should be tightened.
C.  The Level of Contributions
Despite the generous replacement rates Costa Rican contribution rates are quite low by international
standards.  CCSS's contibution rate is a total of 7.5 percent, split between employees (2.5 percent),
employers (4.75 percent), and the government (0.25 percent).'  In the past, the government failed to make
its contributions to the fund regularly.  The special schemes also require very low contribution rates
compared to the replacement rates they promise.  The recent increase in the contribution rate of the
Teacher's  Scheme from 7 to 9 percent was contested in courts as unconstitutional.  In special regimes
workers'  contributions cover approximately 10 percent of total expenditures.  The rest are paid by the
government.
Despite its relatively low contribution rate, CCSS suffers from extensive evasion by private sector
employees.  Workers try to evade the system until later in their work life, when they start contributing to
become eligible for a pension.  Even then, under-reporting of salaries is common by high income workers,
and only the amount that entitles them to maximum pension is reported.  For low income workers, there is
an incentive to inflate the level of reported salaries during the last five years of employment that form the
basis for calculating the pensionable salary.  The weak link between the contributions and benefits leads the
contributers to view the system as a tax on labor rather than as a forced savings scheme.
4  Although  pension contribution rates for workers is low, workers are already subject to very high tax rates, which may hamper
the feasibility  of reforms that include increases  in contribution  rates.
8III.  Financial  Condition  of the Present  System
A.  Financial Equilibrium
In a pure pay-as-you-go system, the revenues of the pension plan must equal its expenditures.  Most
real world public pension schemes are not pure pay-as-you-go and accumulate a surplus in their early years
and incur a deficit later on.  However, the aim of most public pillars is to balance revenues and




C is the contribution rate as a percentage of average wages, R is the replacement rate, which is
given by the average pension as a percentage of average earnings at retirement, and D is the dependency
rate, which is given by the number of beneficiaries as a percent of the number of contributors.
The contribution rate required to cover the cost of a pay-as-you-go system depends on two major
variables, the dependency rate and the benefit rate.  For example, if there is one retiree for every ten
workers and if beneficiaries have been promised an average pension that equals 80 percent of the average
wage, then an 8 percent contribution rate is needed for the system to cover its costs.  But if the population
ages so that there is one retiree for every five workers, then the contribution rate has to go up to 16 percent
to keep its promise of 80 percent replacement rate.  Conversely, to keep the contribution rate at 8 percent,
the replacement rate has to be reduced to 40 percent.
Both the dependency rate and replacement rate depend on several demographic and economic
factors.  The dependency rate is affected by factors such as labor force participation, unemployment,
evasion, retirement age, early retirement, number of survivors and disabled workers, changes in birth and
mortality rates, and system maturation.  Similarly the replacement rate is affected by the definition of
pensionable salary, by minimum and maximum pensions, by inflation indexation, and by the adjustments
made for early retirement and disability and survivors' pensions.
In a partially funded scale premium system, the required contribution rate is initially increased by
the targeted increase in reserves, but later on with the accumulation of reserves, it is reduced by the
amount of investment income available in excess of administrative expenses.  The impact of the investment
income depends on the size of the reserves and how well they are invested.
B.  Current Financial Position
In Costa Rica, the CCSS generated a surplus throughout 1975-85 (except in 1981) but the sickness-
maternity program had a deficit during 1975-81 and was subsidized by the pension program. In 1981, a law
prohibited this type of cross-subsidy, and by 1986 reserves were no longer invested in the sickness-
maternity program.  More recently, the system has been under increasing pressure due to generous
benefits, low contribution rates, poor investment performance, and evasion through not contributing or
under-reporting.  The government has not been able to pay its contributions to CCSS.  The government is
9also under pressure from specialized schemes which have very low contribution rates and early retirement
ages for the replacement rates they offer.
In 1988, an actuarial review concluded that costs of the system would exceed its revenues by 1993.
It recommended a rise in the contribution rate, or a rise in the retirement age, or a mixture of both to
prevent a crisis.  The recent reforms undertaken by the government aimed to: (i) decrease the financial
pressures on CCSS by increasing the retirement age and by modifying the benefit formula to decrease the
replacement rate; (ii) unify all special schemes under one scheme; and (iii) create a system of
complementary private pensions.
Efforts to unify special programs are still under way.  Voluntary savings schemes are emerging
although they are very limited.  Legislation to regulate these private savings plans is pending approval.
The increase in the retirement age and the modification of the benefit formula, however,  were not adequate
measures to reduce the financial pressures on CCSS.  The most recent actuarial review (1993) showed that
even with these changes, the system will not be able to maintain equilibrium and will run into trouble by
1996.  This indicates the urgency of further reforns  in the system.
C.  Long Run Prospects
The longer run prospects for financial viability are dominated by demographic conditions.  Table 4
shows the sharp increase in the elderly population (60 and above) expected in the coming decades.  By the
year 2020, the elderly population will have more than doubled from its current level, and by 2050, it will
have quadrupled as a percentage of the total population.
Table 4
Costa  Rica:  Demographic  Structure,  1990-2050
1990  2000  2020  2050
Percent of Population Age 60 and Above  6.4  7.8  14.3  26.4
Percent of Population Age 65 and Above  4.2  5.4  9.5  20.1
Dependency Rate:  ratio of population aged 60 and above to
population aged 20-59  .133  .152  .256  .555
Also  number  of retirees  supported  by  each worker
Dependency Rate:  ratio of population aged 65 and above to
population aged 20-64  .084  .100  .156  .37
Also  number  of retirees  supported  by each worker
Source:  World Bank Population Projections
10Based  on the current contribution  rate and current replacement  rate, the simulation  model described
in the Annex  is used to compute  the number  of workers  required  to support  each retiree. One method of
assessing  the prospects  for financial  viability  is to compare  the required worker  per retiree ratio with the
number  of potential  workers  per potential  retiree in the future based on demographic  projections. If the
average  worker enters the labor force at age 18 and retires at age 61, under the current system, this worker
would receive 83 percent of the average  of the four highest  years' salary. With the current contribution
rate of 7.5 percent, if fully indexed,  such a pension  system,  would  require 13.4 workers  per retiree.  Even
as far back as 1985, this large a workforce  relative  to retiree population  did not exist.
The current surplus  in the CCSS  exists  due to incomplete  inflation  indexation. Inflation  increases
the nominal  value of the contributions  coming into CCSS,  but if the benefits are not increased  to match
inflation,  then the contributions  will exceed  expenditures. Table 5 shows the average  pension  as a
percentage  of average wage  for the years 1985-91,  suggesting  that actual pensions  paid are far below what
has been promised. The numbers  are even worse than they  appear in that the denominator  in Table 5 is the
average  wage, not the average  of the four highest  years' salary. For example, the average  pension  of the
elderly between 1985 and 1991, as shown in Table 5, was 68.5 percent of the average  wage, but only about
40 percent of the average individual's  final 4 year salary. With  the old age pension  set at the 1985-91
average  of 68.5 percent of the average  wage, the required worker to retiree ratio to maintain  financial
solvency  falls to 8.7.
TABLE  5
Costa  Rica:  Effective  Replacement  Rates, 1985-91
1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991
Ratio of Average Pension (All) to  51.9  42.3  48.2  42.6  37.5  38.9  41.7
Average Wage
Ratio of Average Pension (Old Age) to  85.5  72.4  78.8  64.5  56.2  59.1  63.1
Average Wage  l
Source: Anuario  Estadistico,  Departamento  de Estadistica  Seccion,  Estadisticas  De Seguridad  Social,
1991.
Figure 1 shows the potential  worker per potential  retiree ratio from 1985  to 2075 based on World
Bank  population  projections. All individuals  aged 18 to 61 are considered  to be potential  workers, all
individuals  aged above 61 are considered  potential  retirees. The bars show  the ratio of potential  workers  to
potential  retirees at five year intervals. It is clear that the pension  promise, which  requires 13.4 workers
per retiree, cannot  be fulfilled  even today.  At some point  between 1990 and 1995, even the current
inflation-reduced  benefit, which  requires  8.7 workers per retiree, will run into deficit. Evidence  from the
CCSS  comes to the same conclusion. The 1992  CCSS  Statistical  Yearbook  shows that the contributions
received  total 17 billion colones, while expenditures  amounted  to 16.7  billion colones, suggesting  that even
a small rise in the elderly population  will cause expenditure  to exceed  contributions.
11Potential Workers Per Retiree in Costa Rica
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Although  the analysis  in Figure 1 shows  potential  worker  to potential  retirees, the actual worker to
retiree ratio may deviate  somewhat. A rise in real wage  growth from the current level of growth will
lower  the required  worker to retiree threshold,  allowing  the system  to remain solvent  slightly longer.
Similarly,  expansion  of pension  coverage  to include  previously  uncovered  workers  will temporarily  enlarge
the worker-retiree  columns  for about  40 years, again extending  the period of solvency. On the other hand,
evasion  will shrink the worker-retiree  columns,  increasing  the likelihood  of insolvency. In fact, the
contributor/beneficiary  ratio in 1992 was 7.3, below that shown  in Figure 1.  Part of the explanation  lies in
the large number  of invalidity  pensions  which result in both a reduction  in the contributors  and a rise in the
beneficiaries. Financially,  this has been balanced  by the lower  average  pensions  received by these
individuals,  as shown in Table 5.  But what is clear from Figure 1 is that while labor market conditions
may speed  up or delay the precise  date of financial  insolvency,  the current system cannot  be sustained  in
the long run.
12The surplus built by the current system, roughly 56 billion colones, can also be used to delay
financial collapse.  The fund is roughly equal to 3.4 years worth of current benefits.  Since contributions
will continue to pay for the bulk of benefits for the next 10 years, the fund will not be fully exhausted until
around 2010.  The system will be completely bankrupt at that point.  Since transition to a more sustainable
pension system will involve some costs, our proposal is to undertake reform while this surplus
exists so that the surplus can be used to alleviate transition costs.
Another way to evaluate the financial sustainability is to calculate the contribution rates required to
sustain the actual current benefit level of 68.5 percent of average wage.  Table 6 shows a sharp rise in
contribution rates, particularly after 2015.  The government is clearly unable to make up the difference
between the current employer-employee contribution of 7.25 percent and the required contribution rate in
the long run.  And this analysis excludes government costs arising from special schemes.  The government
is currently spending approximately 2 percent of GDP on special schemes.  If we assume the increase in
costs for special schemes is similar to that for the CCSS, then special schemes would cost about 5 percent
of GDP by 2025 and the CCSS cost would be about 10 percent of total wages by 2025, or approximately
another 2.8 percent of GDP.  If government expenditures remain at their current level of 23 percent of
GDP, pension payments would absorb more than a third of the budget-by 2025 (as opposed to 15 percent in
1994).
A final method of looking at the financial sustainability of the CCSS is to look at the average
replacement rates which would be viable keeping the current contribution rate fixed.  In the past, the
pension benefit has simply been inflated away, reducing the average replacement rate.  If this practice were
to continue, by 2025, the benefit would be about 41 percent of the 1995 benefit.  Table 6 shows the future
replacement rates resulting from a fixed 7.5 percent contribution.  The current retirees would clearly have
Table 6
Costa Rica
Required Contribution Rates and Viable Replacement Rates
Under  Changing  Demographic  Conditions  l
1995  2005  2015  2025  2050  2075
Contribution Rates Required to Provide a  8.0  9.0  11.9  17.8  31.2  36.1
Pension  Worth  68.5 % of Average  Wage
Pension as a Percentage of Average Wage  64.6  57.0  43.2  28.8  16.4  14.2
Resulting  from  a 7.5%  Contribution
benefitted at the expense of their children and grandchildren since the 14.2 percent of average wage
available to retirees in 2075 (less than 30 percent of minimum wage) is not enough to provide a living
standard above the poverty line.
D.  Investment Performance
13Poor investment performance of the Costa Rican pension fund worsens its financial problems.  The
real returns on CCSS pension investments have been either negative or low in the past,  leading to a
shrinkage in the fund in real terms.  The composition of CCSS investments are given in Table 7.
The largest component of the investment portfolio is in short term investments which are
approximately 95 percent government paper and 5 percent bank deposits.  The next largest component is
long term investments which are again almost completely held as government bonds, which typically yield
negative real returns. Mortgages are mostly to CCSS employees at below market rates, and therefore also
have low yields, and very high administrative costs.  Finally, government arrears to CCSS have also been
depleting the reserves.  This is a very poor investment record, especially since real interest rates are very
high in Costa Rica, at 15 percent.
It is necessary to enhance the investment performance of pension funds. The pension fund should be
encouraged to invest in safe marketable securities in addition to government bonds.  It is difficult for a
small country like Costa Rica to invest only domestically and diversify risks and earn high rates of return.
In time, as their expertise develops pension funds should be allowed to invest internationally as well as
domestically, perhaps up to 50 percent of their reserves.
CCSS  and the Ministry of Finance are in the process of designing a new investment strategy for
CCSS which will require the government to pay positive real rates of return on its bonds and which will
allow CCSS to invest in the stock market.
Table 7
Costa Rica: Real Return on and Compostion of CCSS Investments
Year  Short Term  Long Term  Mortgages  State  Other  Tot.
Invest.  Invest.  Arrears  real
%  real  %  real  %  real  %  real  %  real  ret.
ret.  ret.  ret.  ret.  ret.
1987  43  7  27  -3.6  15  1.4  3  -8.4  12  -12  .04
1988  35  -2.2  31  -7.3  18  -4.7  4  -15.1  12  -17.5  -6.0
1989  40  12.2  18  -3.4  22  9.6  3  -5.01  17  -6.4  6.7
1990  40  -2.6  14  -9.0  26  -2.4  4  -16.4  16  -19.1  -6.85
1991  58  4.8  12  -12.8  21  -0.8  5  -15.5  4  -18.4  -3.57
Source: Inversiones De La Reserva Del Seguro de Invalidez, Vejez y Muerte, Departamento Actuarial,
1992.
14IV.  Options for Reform
A.  Objectives of Reform
Ideally pension systems should facilitate individuals' efforts to save for their old age and redistribute
additional income to the old who are lifetime poor.  The Costa Rican public pension system is costly and
unsustainable in the long run.  Furthermore, although the system intends to enhance income equality and
provide old age security, its structure leads to the following perverse redistributions:
*  The system is supposed to redistribute toward the poor, however the government contributes to
CCSS and even more to the special regimes with funds raised from general tax revenue.  Therefore,  the
system redistributes from uncovered (poor) to the covered, and among the covered employees from people
covered by CCSS to those covered by special regimes.
*  The system also redistributes from longer service employees to shorter service employees since it
has a declining accrual rate.  In the benefit formula the first 20 years is worth 60 percent replacement rate
whereas the next 20 years brings approximately 20 percent more.  There is no added benefit after the age
of 65.
*  The system greatly redistributes to disability pensioners due to lax regulations in eligibility and
generous benefits.
*  The minimum eligibility requirement is another source of adverse redistibution since individuals who
do not complete their 20 years are not eligible for any pension.
*  The system is supposed to protect the old against inflation but inadequate indexation is used to lower
the effective replacement rates.  The pensions erode down to the minimum pension as people age.
*  The weak link between contributions and benefits leads to under-reporting of salaries and evasion.
Thus, the system redistributes from those who can evade (private sector employees) to those who cannot
(public sector employees).
*  Like other defined benefit pension systems, the system redistributes from poor to high income
people due to differences in life expectancy and differences in career patterns of earnings.
Some of these adverse redistributions are caused by design errors.  However, not all of the Costa
Rican pension problems are incidental design errors.  Instead, they are basic to the public social security
systems.  Publicly managed old age security systems are inherently in conflict because they are asked to
fulfill multiple goals that are not compatible, and this opens the door to strategic and political manipulation.
In most cases they are supposed to provide social insurance in which contributions are related to expected
benefits, and also to redistribute income toward the old who have been poor over their lifetime.  In a
redistributive system, such as the Costa Rican system, benefits are not closely linked to contributions.  If
15the system is actuarially fair along insurance principles, the redistributive objective is not met.  The
combination of these two goals in one earnings-related scheme opens the door to worst of both worlds: non-
transparent benefits are not linked to contributions, which privileged groups can manipulate to gain perverse
redistributions.  Many individuals regard their contributions as a tax, with all its distortionary
consequences, especially the incentive to evade.  This outcome is not inevitable but certainly wide-spread.
See Box 2 for a brief review of recent international experience in the area of pension reform.
16Box 2:  International  Experience in Pension  Reform
The old age security  problem exists all around the world, but it takes  different forms.  In most of Africa and parts of Asia
the proportion  of people who are old is relatively  small and they have long been cared for by extended family arrangements,
mutual aid societies, and other informal mechanisms. But as extended family ties weaken due to urbanization, mobility, wars and
famine, these countries are being forced to reevaluate their reliance on informal systems. The informal system is coming under
particular strain in countries where the proportion of the population  that is old is growing rapidly due to medical  improvements
and declining fertility, as in East Asia.  As a result of all these factors, several Asian and African countries are considering
fundamental  changes in the way they provide old age security.  The challenge they face is how to move toward formal systems of
income maintenance  without accelerating  the decline in informal systems, and how to avoid shifting a larger responsibility to
government  than it can effectively  handle.
The need to reevaluate policy is even more pressing in Latin America and the transitional socialist economies  that, in the
past, introduced  formal programs of old age security whose costs they can no longer afford.  Early retirement, evasion and overly-
generous entitlements lead to a high ratio of beneficiaries  to contributors  and require payroll taxes of over 30 percent in many of
these countries; this distorts the labor market and encourages  further evasion. Not surprisingly these countries have been unable to
pay the promised benefits and have reduced their real value, usually by failing to index pensions in the presence of high inflation.
Argentina tried to deal with the fiscal crisis and inflation  of the late 1970's by raising contribution  rates and indexing
pensions. However, the indexation raised costs and increased contribution  rates caused greater evasion.  Combined  with the
unemployment  of the mid-1980's, the result was a larger deficit. To avoid insolvency,  Argentina arbitrarily reduced pension
benefits  below legally determined  targets and increased general revenue finance. However, this arbitrary reduction  of pension
benefits was successfully  challenged in courts and the government  had to face unpaid pension liabilities, as well as a pension
system that was in need of immediate  reform.  With the recent reforms, Argentina  created a new public pension system and a new
parallel private pension system.  The new public scheme will be run on a funded basis and was created for new entrants into the
labor force.  The existing public scheme will not accept new members  and will be phased out.  There will also be a flat public
pension for individuals who have contributed for at least 20 years.
Uruguay is in a similar condition. When the pension system ran into financial  problems in the 1970's, authorities first
responded  by reducing real benefits through inadequate  inflation indexation. However, legislation  was passed to prevent this real
decline, thereby necessitating  increased  contributions  as well as government  transfers.  By 1989  contribution rates reached 30
percent of payroll, leading to substantial  evasion.  In 1990,  27 percent of total pension expenditures were covered by public
treasury; this constituted 2.6 percent of GDP and about 10 percent of the government's general budget. Today, reforms are still
being considered.
Although  the Chilean pension system faced similar problems in the 1970's, Chile chose to undertake a fundamental
reform of its pension system.  It instituted  a government-regulated  but privately-run  mandatory  savings system supplemented  by a
pay-as-you-go  public plan that guarantees a minimum  benefit to workers with low incomes or interrupted  employment careers who
are not able save enough for adequate  pensions. During its first ten years of operation, the new Chilean system accumulated
resources equal to 30 percent of GDP and achieved  an average real return of 13 percent per year, despite its relatively high
operating costs.  The success of Chile has encouraged other Latin American  countries to consider a reform away from pay-as-you-
go defined  benefit systems toward fully funded defined contribution  accounts.
Eastern European countries  also suffer from strong financial  pressures on their pension systems.  These countries have
widespread  coverage, old populations, high expenditures  relative to GDP, high payroll taxes that induce  evasion and deter private
sector growth, and promise early retirement with generous replacement  rates.  Unable to cope with the large macroeconomic
shocks they have been experiencing,  the transitional  socialist countries cannot  keep their pension promises and are reevaluating
their old systems.  A major deterrent to change is the large unfunded  pension debt they owe retirees and older workers.
In several Asian and African  countries, the pension system is based on national provident funds. These are forced
savings schemes that involve the use of individual  capitalization  accounts  operated by a public agency.  In Singapore  and Malaysia,
where the level of contribution  rates is very high, the provident funds have accumulated  very large long-term resources, amounting
respectively  to 72 and 41 percents of GDP in 1987.  The main difference  with the Chilean scheme is the public management  of
funds.  This has resulted in lower operating  costs but also lower investment  returns.  In fact except for Singapore  and Malaysia,
provident funds in several Asian and African countries  suffered from negative  real rates of return.
Many countries in the Arab world as well as in Asia and the Middle East, such as Jordan, Turkey and the Phillippines,
operate with partially funded scaled premium schemes. In general, these schemes face uncertain actuarial futures because of their
growing maturity  and the progressive aging of their covered  populations. Most schemes  also suffer from poor investment  returns
17Box 2:  Continued.
on their accumulated  reserves.  The case of Egypt is particularly  interesting. A very hiigh  contribution rate of 26 percent in
relation to the very young demographic  structure of the country has contributed to the accumulation  of very large financial
resources which amounted to 40 percent of GDP in 1988.  However, the reserves have been placed with the National Investment
Bank to finance public expenditures  and public sector companies. Negative real rates of return reduced the relative importance of
pension reserves to 30 percent of GDP by 1991.  The very high contribution  rate in Egypt is not based on an actuarial assessment
of future pension liabilities; instead the system is more of a tax on labor, used to fund the deficit of the public sector.
O.E.C.D. countries have paid substantial  pensions during the last three decades, a period of prosperity during which
poverty among the old declined  faster than poverty  among the young.  But they too face problems with their old age security
systems, as their population ages and productivity  stagnates. This has led to inter-generational  conflict between the old retirees
who are getting public pensions and the young workers who are paying high taxes to finance them.  Required  payroll tax rates are
expected  to rise by several percentage points and benefits to fall, over the next two decades, so the young workers may never
recoup their contributions. Lurking in the background is the suspicion that past social security  arrangements may have
discouraged work, saving and productive  capital formation and thereby contributed  to the current fiscal deficit and economic
stagnation,  that these arrangements might not have been adopted in their present form if their full effects had been foretold and if
young as well as old generations  had participated in the decision. Many O.E.C.D.  countries  appear to be moving toward the
growtli of privately managed  personal or occupational  pension plans for higher income groups, combined with publicly managed
pension plans targeted toward basic needs and lower income groups.  In addition, almost  all have raised retirement ages and/or
contribution  rates in addition to reducing benefits.
This brief tour around the world shows that there are strong pressures on the financial  viability of public pension systems
that operate on a pay-as-you-go  or partially funded basis. There is an international  trend towards a lowering of pension benefits
offered by public schemes and toward the adoption  of a multi-pillar  structure with privately-run  systems complementing  the
benefits offered by the existing public schemes.  The promotion of private pension schemes  increases the importance  of regulation
and supervision in order to ensure the safety and profitable investment  of accumulated  funds. However, they appear to enjoy
various advantages over unfunded  or partially funded public schemes  and their role is growing in many developed and developing
countries.
This review draws extensively  on The Old Age Security Report, 1994 and Vittas and Skully, 1991.
B.  Impact of the Public Pension System on the Broader Economy
Countries evaluating their pension systems and considering different reform options should be aware
of the impact a public pension system has on the broader economy.  In fact, public pension systems have
important effects on labor markets, saving and capital markets, income distribution and poverty alleviation,
and public finance.
(i) labor markets:  The payroll tax financed public pension systems have three important effects on
labor markets.  First,  the payroll tax which is not linked closely to benefits may lead workers to withdraw
from the labor force.  Second, it will make it more likely for workers to escape to the informal sector.  In
countries where only a minority of the total labor force is covered and the informal sector is large, evasion
is particularly easy.  Third, the benefit formula may encourage earlier retirement, since absence of rewards
or the presence of penalties for late retirement are common.  All of these effects lead to lowering of the
supply of trained workers and therefore lower labor productivity.
(ii) savings and capital markets:  The savings impact of a pay-as-you-go versus funded pension
system is not clear in pension literature.  Still, a funded plan has the potential for a more positive effect on
18long term savings, capital accumulation, financial market development and economic growth than a pay-as-
you-go plan.  However, whether this potential is realized depends on how the funds are managed and how
they interact with the government's spending patterns.  To ensure efficient allocation of these reserves,
governments should compete for their use with other domestic and international borrowers.  The beneficial
effects of funded plans are lost if they are run by monopolistic public managers.
(iii) income distribution and poverty alleviation: Even if there are no design problems, in public
pension schemes little redistribution takes place from rich to poor over their lifetime.  The basic reason is
that upper  income contributors enter the labor force later in life and live longer after retirement, thereby
contributing less and receiving more lifetime benefits than lower income contributors.  A second type of
transfer which takes place in all unfunded or partially-funded schemes is the intergenerational transfer.
Generally, earlier older generations tend to do better than later generations regardless of income level since
the systems mature and contribution rates have to be increased in time.  In some cases, redistributions have
gone from low income young generations to high income older generations.
(iv)  public finance:  Although pension reserves are usually kept nominally separate from
government funds, the administrators are under the authority of government and the funds are almost
invariably required to be invested in government securities or in securities of state enterprises.
International money managers and international diversification of the portfolio would improve matters, but
this is not usually allowed.  The resulting negative real rates of return mean that money disappears in real
terms; instead of being accumulated to pay future pensions, capital is misallocated in very capital-scarce
countries.  In effect the payroll tax is being used in place of other taxes to finance general governmental
expenditures.
The following sections discuss two reform options.  The first is a limited reform option, which
keeps the present sytem and outlines the changes that are needed to make the system financially sustainable
and more equitable.  The second is a more radical reform that would go beyond changing the basic
parameters of the existing system and recognizes the conflicting goals of the present system.  This reform
would lead to a multi-pillar old age security system (see Box 1).
C.  Limited Reform
The following is a list of reforms that retains the present system but makes it financially sustainable
and more equitable by eliminating some design flaws.  However, it should be noted at the outset that
financial sustainability in the long term will require either enormously high contribution rates, or less than
poverty level benefits, neither of which may be feasible or desirable.  So while the limited reform may be
attractive today and will remove some of the inequities in the existing system, in the longer term a more
radical reform will be required.
To make the system more equitable and to enable redistributions from high income to poor individuals, the
following unintended redistibutions should be removed:
19*  To avoid redistributions among different schemes and minimize redistributions from poor to rich:
The government has started the unification process for the specialized schemes.  Ideally, all schemes,
including CCSS, should be unified under one scheme for obvious equity reasons.  The government is
currently considering extending the coverage of CCSS to all the active population or even making it
universal.  To the extent that covered workers are in higher income groups than uncovered workers, care
must be taken not to finance benefits for the formner  out of taxes paid by the latter.  As coverage expands,
lower income groups who enter later may have to pay higher contributions and get a lower rate of return
than the first groups to be covered under a pay-as-you-go plan.  It is very important to have a benefit
structure that counters this regressivity stemming from inter-generational transfers as coverage expands.
All defined benefit pension systems redistribute from poor to high income people to some extent.  These
are inevitable and arise from differences in life expectancy between low and high income people and from
differences in career patterns of earnings.
*  To avoid redistributions from public sector employees to those in the private sector, both covered
under CCSS:  All covered workers under CCSS, public and private employees alike, should be treated
equally.  At present private sector employees can evade the system by under-reporting their salaries for
most of their careers and get high pensions by inflating or correctly reporting their salaries for the last five
years.  A stronger link between benefits and contributions would eliminate most of the incentives to evade.
Changing the pension base from salaries in the last five years to average lifetime earnings corrected for
inflation would eliminate some of the incentives for evasion.
*  To avoid redistributions toward disability pensioners:  In Costa Rica until 1991 more people were
receiving disability pensions than old age pensions.  Now the numbers are roughly equal.  The recent
change in the benefit formula is not adequate to counter this effect.  Disability pensions should be less than
old age pensions and requirements to qualify for this pension should be more strict.  Furthemore,  without
an explicit early retirement provision, individuals tend to use disability pensions for early retirement.
Including an explicit early retirement provision with appropriate actuarial reduction in pension benefits to
compensate for the increased duration of those benefits would eliminate some of the problems with the
disability pensions.
*  To avoid redistributions from long-service to short-service workers:  In the benefit formula the first
20 years are valued three times higher than the next 20 years.  Furthermore, delaying retirement after age
65 is not rewarded.  Using a constant accrual rate would prevent this redistribution.  Alternatively, use of
actualized lifetime or long-term earnings would obviate the need for using annual accrual factors.
*  To avoid redistributions from those who cannot complete their minimum eligibility period to those
who do:  CCSS's minimum eligibility requirement of 20 years discriminates against workers with less than
the minimum vesting period who lose their right to any pension.  Providing proportional pensions based on
the number of years contributed would remove this redistribution.
*  To avoid redistributions due to inadequate indexation for inflation:  This requires two changes.
First the calculation of the pensionable salary should adjust the last five years salaries for inflation.  This
would avoid redistributions from people who retire during high inflationary periods to those who retire
during low inflationary periods (since they retire with a higher real pension).  Second, pensions after
20retirement should be indexed for inflation regularly. If targeted replacement rates are too high they should
be lowered explicitly.  Reducing replacement rates implicitly through inadequate indexation affects the real
pensions of older beneficiaries and hurts people with longer longevity.
To make the system financially sustainable in the medium term, the following changes can be made:
*  Increase the normal retirement age:  To contain the increase in costs and lower the dependency rate,
the nornal  retirement age could be gradually increased to 65, or even 67 years.  Figure 2 shows the effect
of raising the retirement age to 65 from the current average of 61.  The system can remain financially
solvent, but only until somewhere between 2010-2015.
Potential  Workers  per  Retiree  in Costa  Rica
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*  Provide actuarial increments for retirement after 65: This would remove existing distortions in
21favor of earlier retirement.
*  Increase the contribution rate and eliminate contributions from the government:  To avoid financial
problems in the near future, contribution rates should be gradually increased to over  10 percent.
Government contribution should be eliminated since this redistributes from uncovered to covered workers.
Figure 3 shows the impact of increasing the contribution rate to 10 percent while keeping the retirement age
at 61.  Again, this reform prolongs financial viability for a number of years until somewhere between 2010
and 2015.
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*  Decrease the replacement ratio and introduce declining replacement rates with salary:  The benefit
ratio can be further modified to lower replacement rates explicitly. Ideally, replacement rates should
incorporate a constant or increasing accrual rate to reward long service and minimize evasion.  Declining
22replacement  rates allow lower replacement  rates for higher income  workers.  Decreasing  the replacement
rate explicitly  will also prolong  financial  solvency,  as shown in Figure 3, but again only for a limited
period of time.  Lowering  the pension  replacement  rate to 50 percent of average wage  from the current
68.5 percent allows the system  to remain solvent  until between  2010 and 2015.  Lowering  the pension
replacement  rate even further to 40 percent of average  wage allows  the system to remain solvent  even
longer, until between 2015 and 2020.
*  Replace  the level amount of maximum  pension  by a maximum  replacement  rate for high income
workers: This strengthens  the link between  contributions  and benefits  and should  decrease  under-reporting
and evasion  by high income workers.
*  Unbundle  health and pension  benefits: Health and pension  benefits should  be separated. Since
health costs tend to increase  at a much higher rate than pension  expenditures  as populations  age, keeping
health and pension  benefits together  would  add to the financial  problems  in the future. Unbundling  will
also strengthen  the link between  contributions  and benefits.
*  Improve  the investment  performance  of reserves: The reserves  should  be invested in safe
marketable  securities  at market rates of return. International  diversification  should  be allowed  with
adequate  supervision. A high return on investment  reserves  would help improve  the financial  condition  of
the system.
However, it should be noted that all of the reforms oriented  toward  maintaining  financial  solvency
are only successful  in the short to medium  term and will not provide  long term security.
D.  Radical  Reforrn
No matter how well designed,  defined  benefit  public pension  systems  are inherently  in conflict  due
to the redistribution  and social insurance  objectives. The move to a multi-pillar  scheme  would solve  this
dilemma  by separating  the redistributive  and social insurance  functions  of old age security programs. In
this multi-pillar  system, the first pillar would be a pay-as-you  go public  pillar which  would have the
primary responsibility  to redistribute  to the old who are lifetime  poor.  The second pillar which would  be a
savings  pillar, would  have the primary responsibility  to invest people's savings  for old age, through
decentralized,  competitive  but carefully  regulated  defined  contribution  schemes  based on individual
capitalization  accounts. Finally, third and fourth pillars would  consist  of optional  but funded company-
based or occupational  pension  schemes  and voluntary  savings  in the form of bank deposits, marketable
securities,  and investment  in real assets.
(i) The public pillar: The objective  of redistribution  to the old who are lifetime  poor clearly requires
public  management  and tax financing. Institutionally,  CCSS  could be reorganized  to manage  the public
pillar.  But there are quite a few decisions  to be made in the design  of this basic redistributive  pillar.
The first issue is that of coverage  and benefits. One option is to provide  a means-tested  benefit  only
23to the poor.  The big advantage of a means-tested benefit is that for the same expenditure, a larger benefit
can be paid, thus enabling more poverty alleviation or lower taxes.  Another possibility is to provide
universal coverage.  A universal flat-benefit pension system will be administratively simple with minimum
record-keeping demands.  In addition, flat pensions provide some inflation and longevity protection for the
entire population of old people.  That is, risk diversification is provided for the average person (who will
normally contribute to other pillars too).  Finally, flat benefits avoid the disincentive to work and save that
are inherent in means-tested benefits.  For these reasons, flat benefits may be more efficient and will have
wider political support than means-tested pensions.  Yet another option is what is called "restricted flat"
which is a variant of flat pension and covers only a restricted population, usually those who contribute.  In
situations where fiscal resources do not permit a universal coverage, restricted flat may be the preferred
option.  It may also be adopted as a transitional measure and its coverage may be expanded as the country's
fiscal situation improves.  Its major disadvantage is however, that it fails to reach the poorest groups,  such
as old women or people who have been unemployed for substantial portions of their adult lives.  For that
reason, it is a weaker poverty-alleviation instrument than universal flat or means-tested benefits.  Whatever
option is chosen, the benefit should be a minimum but sufficient level necessary for subsistance, and should
be provided after the normal retirement age.
The second issue is that of financing.  For means-tested or universal flat pensions, the financing
should be out of general tax revenue.  If a restricted-flat pension is provided, its financing should be out of
payroll taxes since only those who contribute are covered.  Financing out of general tax revenue, as is the
case now, should be avoided if coverage is restricted to active population (or part of it), to prevent
redistributions from the poor to the covered.  Finally, the system should be pay-as-you-go, and should not
accumulate reserves,  since public investment performance of reserves is generally quite poor world-wide.
In Costa Rica there is already a non-contributive government-financed system, administered by
CCSS,  that provides income to the poor regardless of age.  The current system can be split, and the old-age
part can be re-designed and expanded to create the public pillar.
(ii) The mandatory savings pillar:  The second pillar can be a mandatory retirement saving plan,
structured as a defined contribution scheme based on individual capitalization accounts. If properly
implemented, they are the most effective mechanism to generate savings among workers for income
security in their old age.  One issue is whether they should be voluntary or mandatory.  A mandatory
scheme would protect individuals from myopia, the problem that they may not be far-sighted enough to
save for their old age. If myopia is commnon,  this would put a strain on the public pillar,  in case a means-
tested public pillar is adopted.  Even in the case of a universal pillar,  since the flat benefit will be set at a
very basic level, myopic individuals who could have saved during their working life would experience a
substantial decline in their standard of living with retirement.
Mandatory savings schemes make benefits directly contingent on contributions plus investment
returns and avoid adverse redistributive effects.  They are subject to less evasion and cause fewer
distortions in labor markets.  Their impact on the rate of household and national saving is ambiguous but  it
is likely to be more positive than that of pay-as-you-go plans.  Most important, they have a big impact on
the composition of savings in favor of long-term financial assets and have the potential to stimulate the
development of modern capital instruments and institutions.
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large pension funds and to include incentives for managers to choose the best risk-yield combination of
investments.  The experience of many countries with centrally managed pension funds is not encouraging in
this regard.  Governments have spent these funds on public bonds and public enterprise securities, in effect
using them as a source of general revenue for consumption rather than productive investment.  With
interest and principal non-indexed, rates of return become negative during periods of inflation and
devaluation.
Decentralized mandatory savings schemes have the potential for attaining much higher investment
returns and a more efficient allocation of capital resources.  But the danger here is that marketing costs
might be high, annuities markets weak, and poor choices of investment managers and investments made by
ill-informed workers.  Regulations must be enacted and implemented to prevent this from happening.  To
minimize this risk:
*  only prudent companies should be allowed to manage the funds;
*  this may include joint ventures with experienced foreign firms;
*  investments should be diversified and subject to maximum limits;
*  requirements to invest funds exclusively in public securities should be avoided;
*  investment in overseas securities should be allowed, especially to reduce exposure to country-
specific risks.
Thus, government involvement is necessary for the second pillar as well as the first.  Governments
are generally better at providing prudential regulation rather than managing and investing these funds.  In
Costa Rica, there is a sophisticated off-shore banking system as well as significant non-bank institutions.
The population is very well educated.  Sufficient human capital exists to enable intelligent investment
policies by funds and the development and implementation of effective regulatory rules and institutions.
The government is already in the process of developing prudential regulations for recently established
voluntary savings schemes.  A basic infrastructure for financial regulation of private investors can be
developed and strengthened over the next 20 years as capital continues to accumulate.  At present, domestic
financial sector and the capital market are not large or developed enough to absorb large amounts of
capital.  However, as demand from the savings pillar starts to increase a variety of indexed debt and equity
instruments can be developed.  Nevertheless, given that Costa Rica is a small country, in time the pension
funds should be allowed to invest a substantial proportion of their reserves internationally.
A basic weakness of the mandatory savings pillar is that it fails to guarantee targeted pension
benefits and to protect workers with low wages or interrupted careers.  While the use of indexed
instruments and international diversification help to insure against major inflation or recession at time of
retirement, and regulation of investment options further reduces risk, these measures do not achieve
redistributive objectives or alleviate poverty among the old with long-term limited incomes.  Thus,  in a
pension system with multiple pillars and objectives, a mandatory savings scheme can play an important role
as one of the main compulsory pillars, but it must be accompanied by a public pay-as-you-go pillar to
provide a basic benefit.
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fully-funded company-based pension schemes that would seek to offer additional supplementary benefits.
Such schemes can be offered by large companies, including multinational corporations operating in Costa
Rica (such as that offered by Coca Cola).  These schemes often aim to encourage firm loyalty and firm
specific training, and tend to limit labor mobility. Company-based schemes need to be regulated to ensure
equitable treatment of all employees and safety of their investment assets.  Another possibility is
occupational defined contribution plans. In Costa Rica, the new capitalized teachers plan and other special
regimes could be restructured as voluntary, fully-funded, defined contribution plans.  However, the role of
both company-based and fully-capitalized occupational schemes would be very limited given a second pillar
as described above.  Indeed, since regulation of these schemes is inevitable and since the burden of
guarantees is eventually passed on to the public treasury in any event, a national mandatory saving scheme
is superior to fragmented occupational schemes, on grounds that it minimizes labor market distortions and
maximizes coverage and equity.
(iv)  Voluntary savings pillar: Finally, the fourth pillar would consist of voluntary savings in the
form of bank deposits, life insurance policies and annuities, marketable securities and investments in real
assets, such as owner-occupied housing.  The role of voluntary savings would depend on the role of the
other pillars, especially the size of two compulsory pillars and on their relative fiscal treatment.
Both voluntary savings plans and occupational pension plans tend to cover high income workers
disproportionately.  Voluntary plans have the advantage that they do not distort labor market mobility.
Moreover, they allow individuals to determine the amount of contributions as well as the choice of
investment policies.  They have the disadvantage that myopic workers may not save enough, even when tax
advantages are granted.  Also, those who save may not invest it wisely; studies of saving behavior of
workers suggest that their investment policies are too conservative and do not provide high yields.  This is
why multi-pillar pension system consisting of a public pillar, a national mandatory savings scheme with
regulated investment choices, and a voluntary savings pillar which provides the possibility of modest tax-
advantaged voluntary add-ons is preferable both to fragmented occupational plans and purely voluntary
plans complemented with the public pillar.
E.  Choosing Between Different Reform Options
In choosing between the various reform options, it is important to consider the costs of the various
alternatives.  The first alternative is to do nothing in the way of substantive reform.  The second alternative
is to enact limited reform, such as raising the retirement age to 65.  The third alternative is to implement
radical reform, consisting of the flat universal pension, complemented by a mandatory savings scheme.
Table 8 summarizes the costs of the various options.
Table 8
Costa  Rica: Present Value  of Government  Costs, 1993-2075,  under Different  Reform Options (billion 1
1992 colones)
26OPTION  UNIVERSAL  MEANS  CCSS  SPECIAL  TOTAL
TESTED  REGIMES
a. Promise  a. Promise
3629.9  6677.5
No Reform  142.9  2904.7
b. Current  b. Current
l  ___________  _____________  1717.6  4765.2
a. Promise  a. Promise
Limited  2512.6  4874.0
Refonn  ~~~~~142.9  2218.5
l  Reform  b. Current  b. Current
1051.9  3413.3
Radical  1911.9  Transition  Transition  4556.6
Reform  1037.3  1607.4  - 56.0
4500.6
Under the no reform  option, the costs to the government  consist  of three types.  First, the current
system  provides some  means tested pensions  for the extremely  poor elderly at government  expense. The
present  value of these costs from 1993 to 2075, using the simulation  model  presented  in the Annex, is
around 142.9 billion colones. Second,  the CCSS  system  entails two types of costs on the government,  the
0.25 percent of the covered wage  base which is the government's  contribution  and the shortfall  which the
system  will face if no reform takes place, implying  no change  in retirement  age, contribution  rate, or
benefit  rate.  Assuming  that the pension  is fully inflation  indexed  and that individuals  who work 43 years,
from age 18 to 60, receive  the 83 percent of their highest  years' salary that they have been promised, the
simulation  model projects  that the present  value of the combination  of these two costs for CCSS will
amount  to 3629.9 billion  colones. Taking  the more conservative  approach  that the government  will choose
to allow inflationary  erosion of pensions  and setting  the benefits  at their 1985-91  average  level, the costs
come down considerably  to 1717.6  billion  colones. The government  could continue  to lower  costs by
further  eroding the purchasing  power  of pensions. However,  this would result in severe consequences  on
the purchasing  power of the elderly, many of whom  are receiving  close to the minimum  pension  already.
Third, the final element  of government  costs arises from the special  regimes. With very little data on their
operations,  we can make only rough calculations  based  on CCSS  data as to how fast their costs will rise.
The present value estimate  is calculated  at 2904.7 billion  colones. This is probably  an underestimate  since
the 1993  projected  value is 25 percent lower  than the actual 1993  value. However, the sum of all these
costs come to 4765.2 billion  colones  under the inflation  erosion option and 6677.5 billion  colones  under the
promised  pension  option.
Under the limited  reform option, where the retirement  age is raised to 65 years immediately,  we use
similar  methods  to estimate  costs. While the cost of the means  tested pension  remains the same since its
qualifying  age was already 65 years, the costs of both the CCSS and special  regimes falls  considerably.
Under  the full promised  pension,  the present value of costs associated  with CCSS fall to 2512.6 billion
27colones.  Under the inflation reduced pension, the present value of costs fall to 1051.9 billion colones.  The
extremely rough estimate of special regimes costs under the assumption that the retirement age is raised to
65 for these individuals as well is about 2218.5 billion colones.  However, as the system changes, some
transition costs will be incurred.  For example, if the retirement age changes to 65 today, the 62 year old
already retired will generally not be forced to return to the labor force, but will continue to receive
benefits.  Under the extremely conservative assumption that only the currently retired who are below the
new retirement age will receive early benefits and that the new retirement age will be implemented
immediately, the government would incur an additional 13 billion colones in transitional costs.  The total
costs under limited reform will thus be 4887.1 billion colones if the pension promise is fully upheld and
3426.4 billion colones if the average level of inflation erosion from the past is allowed to continue.  Again,
any phasing in or more generous transition toward the new retirement age will raise transition costs
significantly.
The third alternative is the radical reform.  The radical reform costs consist primarily of two
components:  cost of the universal flat pension and transition costs.  The radical reform option evaluated
here gives all individuals aged 65 or older a flat pension with the benefit set at 50 percent of the minimum
wage.  Because all individuals will receive this flat benefit, the means tested noncontributory program
which currently exists can be eliminated.  The present value of the cost of providing this benefit to all
individuals from 1993 to 2075 is estimated to be 1911.9 billion colones.  The transition costs arise from an
extremely generous transition mechanism in which all individuals who are current CCSS members, either as
beneficiaries or as contributors, will be allowed to remain in the system making the same contributions as
today, will retire at the current retirement age, and will receive the current level of benefits until they die.
These individuals, however, will not receive the universal flat pension mentioned above.  These provisions
are generous even with respect to the limited reform option in that all members of the current system can
retain their current retirement age.  The government costs associated with retaining current CCSS members
is estimated to be  1037.3 billion colones.  Note that this is cheaper than continuing the current system
because the huge cost increases projected for CCSS begin when the current 20 year olds retire.  Since
many of the current 20 year olds are not in CCSS yet, the govermnent will save substantially by keeping
these new workers in the new system.  The extremely rough estimate of providing a similar transition
package for the participants of the special regimes is about 1607.4 billion colones.  The combined cost of
radical reform thus ends up about 4556.6 billion colones.  Since the CCSS currently has a surplus of 56
billion colones which could be used to reduce costs, the net cost would be around 4500 billion colones.
Thus, while the radical reform appears cheaper than the no reform option, the limited reform,
allowing the current level of inflation erosion, appears cheaper than radical reform.  However,  several
additional factors need to be considered.  First, a large chunk of the costs involved in the radical reform
are the transition costs.  Looking at the year 2075, the annual cost of the limited reform will be roughly
233.6 billion 1992 colones, while the annual cost of the radical reform will be only 138 billion colones.
Assuming that GDP/worker  remains roughly constant, pensions under the limited reform with the current
level of inflation erosion will cost the government 14.6 percent of GDP, while pensions under the radical
reform will cost the government 8 percent of GDP.  If GDP growth accelerates, both numbers will fall, but
the annual cost of the radical reform pensions will always be smaller.  It is highly likely that the economy
will not be able to afford the high cost of the pensions under the limited reform and will be forced to
undertake  additional  reforms  which will reduce  benefits  or raise contribution  rates to the detriment  of future
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A second consideration is the increase in overall benefits and potential poverty alleviation involved
in the radical reform option.  The flat benefits suggested are 50 percent of the minimum wage paid to all
individuals.  Currently only around half of the working population and less than a third of individuals aged
18-60 (working or not) are covered under any pension scheme.  The radical reform involves a massive
increase in coverage and a resulting decline in old age poverty.  Furthermore, many families have at most
one covered worker.  Since the average pension paid by CCSS is close to the minimum pension of 80
percent of minimum wage, the average family receives a little more than 80 percent of minimum wage.
Under the radical reform, each elderly family member, husband and wife, will receive 50 percent of the
minimum wage, for a combined family total of 100 percent of the minimum wage.  The means tested
pension currently pays about 12.5 percent of minimum wage.  These individuals would be receiving 50
percent of minimum wage.  Plus, current workers will also receive benefits based on their own mandatory
savings.  Thus, the welfare level of current pension recipients will in fact be higher than under the current
system.  While the costs for radical reform appear higher than for limited reform, the benefits are markedly
higher as well.  One approach to lowering the costs of radical reform would be to lower the benefits
somewhat.
A third consideration takes into account spillover benefits which occur as a result of radical reform.
The incentive for manipulating wages and employment records as well as employment itself to reduce
contributions would be eliminated.  Eliminating evasion would make the labor market more efficient and
eliminate the wastage involved in evasion.  Generally, the move from pay as you go pensions to fully
funded mandatory savings pensions will generate savings for the economy.  This additional saving can be
invested and will contribute to growth in the economy.  Finally, the current CCSS surplus funds are
invested in such a way that they historically have generated little real return in an economy where the real
rate of return on other assets has been positive.
To summarize, the above simulations illustrate the urgency of reform by showing that the "no
reform"  option is the costliest alternative the government can choose.  Limited reform option appears less
costly than a radical reform, however, it simply delays problems rather than really solving them once and
for all.  While radical reform may be the costlier reform option - mostly due to the very conservative
transition process we have assumed - its benefits are markedly higher as well.
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30Annex
A. Basic Simulation Model
Figure  1 is based on a simulation model which calculates the required worker per retiree ratio to
maintain solvency in the CCSS scheme.  Workers are assumed to begin work at age 18, earning the real
minimum wage, based on 1992 data, and work until age 61, the average age of retirement.  The average
lifetime wage is assumed to be the 1992 real economy wide average wage.  With both a fixed starting wage
and a fixed average wage over a fixed number of working years, the model generates an average annual
wage growth, which can be used to calculate a final salary.  Since the CCSS pension benefit is based on
final salary, the average pension in real terms is calculated by multiplying the promised replacement rate by
the final salary.  The actual average pension, 1985-91, is already expressed as a percentage of average
wage and is calculated by multiplying the average wage by the average actual replacement rate.  The
average contribution is calculated by multiplying the contribution rate by the average wage.  The average
pension is then divided by the average contribution to determine the number of contributors required to
fund each pensioner.  The model is modified slightly to take into account the modest real wage growth that
Costa Rica has experienced since 1983, which raises contributions, but not benefits.
Table 6 uses the same simulation model and assumptions, but instead of solving for the worker to
retiree ratio, uses the demographic projections from the World Bank Population Projections and the actual
replacement rate to solve for the required contribution rate.  The second line uses the actual demographic
projections and the actual contribution rate to solve for the resulting replacement rate as a percentage of the
economy wide average wage.
Figures 2 and 3 rely on the same simulation model with modifications reflecting the differing
assumptions presented in the text.  In Figure 2, the model calculates the required number of workers to
retirees taking into account that workers work an additional 4 years.  This modification has the effect of
raising the economy wide average wage slightly.  Figure 3 shows the results of changing contribution rates
or replacement rates.
B. Calculation of Costs
No Reform Option
Under the no reform option, the costs to the government consist of three types.  The first
component is the current means tested pension.  The expenditure on the elderly, those aged 65 and above,
is taken out of the total  1992 means tested pension spending.  This annual expenditure is assumed to grow
proportionately with the number of elderly as compared to the number of elderly in 1992.  The present
value of these annual expenditures are then calculated using a 2 percent real interest rate and summed.
31The second cost arises from the CCSS system and can itself be divided into two components:  (1)
the cost of the annual 0.25 percent of total covered wages while the system remains solvent, and (2)
government funding to cover the shortfall once the system becomes insolvent.  The annual cost of the
government contribution is calculated by first computing an annual wage base and then multiplying it by the
government's contribution rate.  The annual wage base is calculated by increasing the current  1992 wage
base proportionately by the projected number of individuals aged 18 to 61 in each year relative to the
number in 1992.
The second component of the CCSS costs involves covering the shortfall once the system becomes
insolvent.  The annual funding shortfall is calculated by calculating the required contribution rates to
maintain system solvency as described in part A and taking the difference between those and the actual
contribution rate and multiplying that difference by the annual wage base.  Initially this shortfall is assumed
to be covered by the current surplus.  Once the surplus is exhausted, the shortfall is passed to the
government budget, generating additional annual costs.
The present value of the annual costs of these two CCSS components are calculated and then
summed from 1993 to 2075.  The real interest rate used for the present value calculations is a real 2
percent.
The third type of cost arises from the Special Regimes.  With little information available on the
Special Regimes, the annual expenditures were calculated by taking the 1992 annual expenditures and
increasing them proportional to the annual increase in the population aged 61 and above.  The annual
revenues are calculated by taking tlhe 1992 revenues and increasing them proportional to the annual increase
in the working age population.  The difference is the anmual  government cost of the Special Regimes.  This
method clearly underestimates the true costs since the actual numbers for 1993 costs exceed the projected
costs by more than 25 percent.
Limited Reform  Option
The same calculations were repeated with the modification that the workers were assumed to
continue working until age 65.  The increase in working years increases the wage base in 1992.  The
required contribution rate is also affected as noted in part A and in the figures, affecting the calculated
shortfall.  The assumption used was that the retirement age jumps immediately to age 65 in 1993.  To the
exent that individuals aged 63 in 1993 and who are already retired are not forced to give up a pension and
return to the labor force, the costs will rise somewhat.
Radical  Reform  Option
Radical reform consists of two types of costs.  The first arises from the universal pension which will
be offered to everyone regardless of labor force participation.  These costs are calculated by multiplying the
number of people aged 65 or older by the universal pension annually.  The total number of people aged 65
32or older is reduced by the number of participants in the old CCSS system based on  detailed information on
CCSS participants by age.
The transition costs arise because individuals who currently belong to either the Special Regimes or
CCSS as either beneficiaries or contributors are allowed to remain in the system.  Current contributors to
CCSS, are expected to continue contributing to age 61 and will collect benefits until age 80.  Current
beneficiaries are expected to continue collecting benefits until age 80.  The present value of the total future
contributions to CCSS is subtracted from the present value of the total future benefits to be paid by CCSS.
The difference is considered the transition costs.  An extremely rough estimate of Special Regime transition
costs was calculated by computing the ratio of current CCSS costs to transition costs and using that ratio
and current Special Regime costs to calculate Special Regime transition costs.
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